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做了这么多年品牌设计，我见过太多中国品牌的生死。

说出来不好听。三条路，全是死胡同。

有些品牌被国际品牌正面击溃，连还手的机会都没有。有些品牌被国际资本收购，名字还在货架上，灵魂早就没了。还有些品牌没死，也没活好——被挤在价格和渠道的缝隙里，活着，但永远长不大。

三条路的终点，都不是强大的中国品牌。

但这不是结局。我看到了一些更深的东西——关于资本结构、关于一夜成名的幻觉、关于时间的复利。这篇文章，把我这些年看到的、想到的、正在做的，全部写下来。

一、三种死法

1.1 被吃掉、被雪藏、被挤进缝隙

死法	代表品牌	怎么死的	现在状态
被国际品牌吃掉	丁家宜、小护士	市场正面竞争，打不过	消失或被边缘化
被国际资本吃掉	大宝、中华牙膏、美加净	被收购，塞进外资矩阵	名字还在，灵魂没了
被挤到缝隙里	蜂花、上海硫磺皂	没死，活在价格带最底层	活着，但永远长不大

被国际品牌吃掉。

宝洁、联合利华、欧莱雅、资生堂。这四家不是单个品牌在跟你打。它们是多品牌集团军作战。

价格带	宝洁旗下	联合利华旗下	欧莱雅旗下
高端（80元以上）	SK-II	德美乐嘉	卡诗、赫莲娜
中高端（40-80元）	沙宣、潘婷高端线	多芬高端线	欧莱雅专业线
中端（20-40元）	海飞丝、潘婷	力士、清扬	欧莱雅大众线
低端（20元以下）	飘柔	夏士莲	—

从二十块到两百块，一个价格缝隙都不留。外资不是不给你位置——是在每个价格带上都有一个品牌堵着你。

国货冲进去，正面打不过，侧面找不到空隙。蜂花活下来了，不是因为打赢了，是因为外资没把十五块以下的价位当成对手。对手不跟你打，不是尊重你，是觉得你不值得打。

被国际资本吃掉。

品牌	收购方	收购后命运
大宝	强生（美国）	从国民品牌降为低端线，创新停滞
中华牙膏	联合利华（英荷）	品牌租赁，外资运营
美加净	联合利华（英荷）	被雪藏多年，后回购但元气大伤
丁家宜	科蒂（美国）	收购后退化，后回购
小护士	欧莱雅（法国）	被收购后品牌逐步消失

收购不是为了发展你。是为了拿走你的渠道位置，腾给它的主力品牌。

外资收到手之后发现一个问题：这些国货老牌子在消费者心里扎得太深了。提价没人买。改配方被骂。换包装说不像了。品牌沉淀得太深，动不了。只能放在低端线，让老消费者有个去处，同时用你的位置挡住其他国货往上走。

被挤到缝隙里。

品牌	品类	价格带	困境
蜂花	洗发水	10-15元	性价比护城河也是天花板
上海硫磺皂	香皂	2元	品类太窄，无法扩展
蓝月亮	洗衣液	中端	被立白和外资夹击
郁美净	儿童面霜	10-20元	年轻消费者流失

这些品牌有稳定的消费者，但永远做不到有品牌溢价。蜂花卖十五块，不是不想卖四十块。是卖四十块的货架位置已经被外资锁死了。

缝隙品牌最大的困境：活着，但长不大。长大了就会被外资盯上，要么被打掉，要么被收购。

二、资本视角：残羹剩饭还剩多少

我懂金融。从资本的角度看，日化行业的竞争不是品牌管理的竞争，是利润池分配的竞争。

2.1 利润池结构

┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              日化行业利润池                  │
│                                             │
│  ┌──────────────────────────┐               │
│  │   品牌溢价 40%-50%       │ ← 外资       │
│  │   宝洁/联合利华/欧莱雅   │               │
│  └──────────────────────────┘               │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                      │
│  │ 渠道成本 25%-35%  │ ← 超市/天猫/抖音    │
│  └──────────────────┘                      │
│  ┌──────────────┐                          │
│  │ 制造成本 15%-20% │ ← 代工厂/原料/物流   │
│  └──────────────┘                          │
│  ┌──────┐                                  │
│  │5%-10%│ ← 几百个国货品牌一起分            │
│  └──────┘                                  │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘

2.2 同一瓶洗发水，谁赚走了钱

环节	外资品牌（海飞丝）	国货品牌（蜂花）
零售价	40元	15元
制造成本	5元	5元
品牌溢价	35元	10元
渠道费用率	~25%	~35%
品牌方利润	高	极薄

同样的液体，同一个代工厂可能都是同一家。出厂之后，一个贴宝洁标卖四十块，一个贴蜂花标卖十五块。二十多块的差价，不在瓶子里，在品牌里。

2.3 国货日化品牌单瓶利润模型

成本项	金额（定价30元为例）	占比
零售价	30元	100%
制造成本	5元	17%
包装成本	3元	10%
物流仓储	2元	7%
渠道费用（平台+投流+主播）	10-12元	33%-40%
营销费用（种草+推广+代言）	5元	17%
管理摊销	2元	7%
税前利润	1-3元	3%-10%

定价三十块，到手利润一到三块。定价降到二十块以下，利润归零或亏损。这还没算退货、滞销、价格战的损失。

2.4 死亡螺旋

品牌弱 → 渠道成本高 → 利润薄 → 没钱投品牌 → 品牌更弱
  ↑                                              ↓
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘

这不是品牌管理的问题。这是资本结构的问题。一个利润空间被压缩到只剩5%-10%的行业，养不出百年品牌。欧美的百年品牌，是在百年前那个“渠道成本低、资本不催熟、消费者不急躁”的年代建起来的护城河。今天中国品牌面临的牌局，不是同一张桌子。

三、一夜成名的幻觉

3.1 谁在做一夜成名的梦

做了这么多年品牌设计，我发现一个奇怪的现象。国内很多做品牌的，都在做同一个梦——一夜成名。

不是他们浮躁。是整个生态在逼他们做梦。

推力	来自谁	怎么逼的
资本	VC/PE	三年上市、五年退出、十倍回报
平台	天猫/抖音/拼多多	算法奖励快、惩罚慢
消费者	直播间用户	被训练成等新品、抢秒杀
竞品	同行	你不快，快的人抢走你的位置

资本不等人。 品牌靠产品力、口碑、复购慢慢积累，十年二十年才能看到回报。资本等不了。品牌在资本眼里不是品牌，是标的。标的需要增速、规模、能在路演PPT上讲的增长故事。

平台不给你慢的机会。 天猫的算法、抖音的流量分发、拼多多的比价机制。所有平台都在做同一件事：奖赏谁跑得快，惩罚谁走得慢。一场直播几千单出去了。下个月不投流，销量归零。不是品牌不想慢，是平台不让你慢。

消费者也被训练成只认新的。 直播间倒计时、限量秒杀、爆款上新。她不是在选品牌，是在选今天谁做活动。品牌好不容易积累了一点认知，一个新品牌冒出来——包装更好看、价格更便宜、直播间更热闹。她走了。

3.2 一夜成名的代价

品牌	怎么成的名	成名之后
完美日记	小红书+头部主播	流量成本涨，复购撑不住估值，股价暴跌
元气森林	0糖0脂0卡打穿品类	可口可乐+百事渠道围剿，经销商二选一
花西子	国风设计+李佳琦	头部主播停播冲击，增长放缓

一夜成名能让你站上舞台。舞台的灯是资本和平台打的。灯关了，你还在不在？

3.3 没做梦的品牌，反而活得更久

品牌	成立时间	怎么活的	核心竞争力
蜂花	1985年	不做种草不投流，包装几十年没换	三十年的消费惯性
上海硫磺皂	1980年代	两块钱一块，货架最底层一直有	特定人群刚需
郁美净	1980年代	一代代人用下来，鲜奶霜	代际传承

蜂花没做过一夜成名的梦。没种过草，没找过头部主播，没在抖音投过流。包装几十年没换过，丑到年轻人在网上吐槽，吐槽上了热搜，反而带了一波销量。

但蜂花不需要热搜。它的消费者不是被种草吸引来的，是“从小家里就用这个”。这种信任不是一波流量能冲出来的，是三十年一瓶一瓶洗发水用出来的。热搜来了，销量涨一波。热搜走了，销量回到原位——但原位也够活。因为它没有为了一夜成名提前花掉未来几年的利润。

一夜成名不是罪。但当成唯一的路就是陷阱。品牌和企业一样，可以有一夜成名的时刻——那个时刻应该是积累到一定程度之后的引爆，不是品牌的全部。把一夜成名当成终极目标，等于把房子盖在烟花上。炸得好看，第二天剩一堆灰。

四、百年品牌的真相

4.1 他们不是一夜成名的

这不能怪中国企业家。不是他们不想做百年品牌。是他们没见过百年品牌是怎么长出来的。

品牌	创立年份	距今	头三十年，它在干嘛
爱马仕	1837年	188年	做了整整六十年马具。马车时代过去，差点死掉。
路易威登	1854年	171年	给法国皇后打包行李的箱子匠，做了十几年才开出第一家店。
香奈儿	1910年	115年	孤儿院长大的女孩，第一家店是帽子店，不是时装店。
资生堂	1872年	153年	第一家店是西式药房。做了四十年药品才转向化妆品。
花王	1887年	138年	最初卖的是进口肥皂。头五十年，只是一个杂货批发商。

这些品牌在头几十年里，没有资本催熟，没有流量加持，没有一夜成名的选项。它们是在一个“慢”是常态的年代里长出来的。那个年代，消费者不期待新品每月上架。资本不要求每年增长百分之三十。平台不搞比价排名。

品牌可以花十年打磨一个产品。花二十年积累一批老客。花五十年成为行业标准。

4.2 他们把最难的时候熬过去了

品牌	经历过的危机
爱马仕	马车被汽车替代、两次世界大战、多次经济危机
资生堂	关东大地震、二战工厂被炸、战后重建
香奈儿	创始人去世、品牌低谷、被收购又回购

这些百年品牌不是没遇到过危机。它们遇到过比今天中国品牌更绝望的危机——战争把工厂炸没了，经济危机把消费者钱包掏空了，技术革命把整个品类淘汰了。但它们没死。因为它们不是在危机来的时候才想到“守”。它们从创立第一天就在守。

4.3 中国品牌只有一个参照系

维度	欧美日百年品牌	中国品牌
成长的时代	慢是常态	快是常态
创始人的参照系	同行做了几十年	GDP增速每年8%+
资本的态度	不催不急	三年五年要退出
消费者的期待	稳定可靠	每月上新
品牌教育	百年历史是常识	几乎空白

中国企业家出生在一个“快”是常态的年代。改革开放四十多年，从一穷二白到全球第二大经济体。这个速度塑造了一种思维模式：一切都可以更快。产品可以更快地出，渠道可以更快地铺，品牌可以更快地红。快是对的，因为整个时代就是快的。

但他们忽略了一件事。品牌不是GDP。品牌是文化。文化没办法速成。一个人可以一夜暴富。一个贵族需要三代人。品牌和贵族一样，需要时间。

品牌的历史教育，在国内几乎是空白。没有人告诉他们爱马仕头六十年在干嘛，资生堂头五十年怎么活下来的。我们只宣传成功的结果，不宣传成功的过程。他们误以为这些品牌是一夜成名的——只是那一夜发生在一百年前。

五、时间是最高的壁垒

5.1 我们写过奢侈品

它们都是上百年了。中国品牌要是也有一百年，国际品牌、国际资本，敢不敢乱吃？不敢。会被噎死。

一个品牌活了一百年，意味着几代人是闻着它的味道、抹着它的面霜、用着它的肥皂长大的。品牌不再是品牌，是集体记忆。资本可以买走商标、买走渠道、买走工厂。但买不走她心里那个“这是我妈用的，我外婆用的”的位置。买不走，就只能让它留在货架上。硬吃，会噎死。

5.2 换个角度看蜂花

维度	蜂花（现在）	蜂花（再活70年）
年龄	约40年	110年
品牌地位	低端国货	中国的花王
定价权	无，被锁死在15元	有，几代人的消费惯性
外资态度	不当对手	不敢碰
品牌价值	靠走量维持	不可复制的品牌资产

你现在看蜂花、上海硫磺皂、郁美净，觉得它们活得憋屈。在货架最底层，卖十几块，利润薄得像纸。但换个角度看——它们已经活了三十多年。再活七十年，就是中国的花王，中国的资生堂。

到那一天，宝洁还敢把它们当残羹剩饭吗？联合利华还敢把它们的商标塞进低端线矩阵吗？资本想吃？会被噎死。

5.3 金融公式

品牌价值 = 未来现金流的折现

短期品牌：现金流不确定 → 折现率高 → 估值低
百年品牌：现金流可预期 → 折现率低 → 估值高

这不是安慰。是金融逻辑。一个活了一百年的品牌，它的现金流是可预期的、稳定的、不需要靠投流维持的。这个确定性在金融市场上值多少钱，不是用年销售额算的，是用“它不可能消失”这个事实算的。而“不可能消失”，只有时间能给。

六、写在最后

我做了这么多年品牌设计，最怕听到的一句话，不是“这个设计不好看”。是“包装嘛，拆完就扔的”。

不是。

包装的终点不是被扔掉。品牌的终点也不是被吃掉、被雪藏、被挤进缝隙。

中国品牌出不来，不是因为我们做不好设计、做不好产品、做不好营销。是因为我们只有三四十年，而对手有一百三十年。

但三四十年已经走完了别人一百年走的路。再给几十年，谁知道呢。

如果有一天，上海硫磺皂成了中国的花王，蜂花成了中国的资生堂，那些曾经被挤到缝隙里的品牌，变成了别人不敢碰的存在——

那一天，不是一夜成名的结果。是时间的复利，终于开始兑现。

中国品牌，缺的不是好产品，或是时间。

English Version

Chinese Brands: What Is Missing Is Not Good Products, But Perhaps Time

I have been doing brand design for many years. I have witnessed the life and death of too many Chinese brands.

It is not pleasant to say it out loud. Three paths. All dead ends.

Some brands are crushed head-on by international brands, without even a chance to fight back. Some are acquired by international capital. The name remains on the shelf. The soul is long gone. Still others are neither dead nor thriving — squeezed into the cracks of pricing and distribution. Alive. But never able to grow.

None of these three paths leads to a strong Chinese brand.

But this is not the end of the story. I have seen something deeper — about capital structure, about the illusion of overnight fame, about the compound interest of time. This article is everything I have seen, everything I have thought about, and everything I am working on, written down in full.

I. Three Ways to Die

1.1 Eaten, Shelved, Squeezed into the Cracks

Fate	Representative Brand	How It Died	Current State
Eaten by international brands	Ding Jiayi, Little Nurse	Defeated in direct market competition	Disappeared or marginalized
Eaten by international capital	Dabao, Zhonghua Toothpaste, Maxam	Acquired, stuffed into foreign brand portfolios	Name remains, soul is gone
Squeezed into the cracks	Bee & Flower, Shanghai Sulfur Soap	Not dead, living at the bottom of the price ladder	Alive, but can never grow

Eaten by international brands.

Procter & Gamble. Unilever. L’Oreal. Shiseido. These four do not fight you with a single brand. They fight as multi-brand army groups.

Price Band	P&G Brands	Unilever Brands	L’Oreal Brands
Premium (80+ yuan)	SK-II	Dermalogica	Kerastase, Helena Rubinstein
Mid-Premium (40-80 yuan)	VS Sassoon, Pantene Premium	Dove Premium	L’Oreal Professionnel
Mid (20-40 yuan)	Head & Shoulders, Pantene	Lux, Clear	L’Oreal Paris Mass
Low (Below 20 yuan)	Rejoice	Hazeline	—

From twenty yuan to two hundred yuan. Not a single price gap is left open. It is not that foreign brands refuse to give you a position. It is that a brand of theirs is blocking you in every single price band.

Domestic brands charge in. They cannot win head-on. They cannot find an opening from the side. Bee & Flower survived not because it won. It survived because foreign brands did not consider the sub-fifteen-yuan price band an opponent. When the opponent does not fight you, it is not respect. It is the judgment that you are not worth fighting.

Eaten by international capital.

Brand	Acquirer	Fate After Acquisition
Dabao	Johnson & Johnson (US)	Demoted from national brand to low-end line, innovation halted
Zhonghua Toothpaste	Unilever (UK/NL)	Brand leased, operated by foreign capital
Maxam	Unilever (UK/NL)	Shelved for years, later repurchased but元气大伤
Ding Jiayi	Coty (US)	Degraded after acquisition, later repurchased
Little Nurse	L’Oreal (France)	Brand gradually disappeared after acquisition

Acquisition is not for developing you. It is for taking your distribution position and vacating it for their main brands.

After the acquisition, foreign capital discovered a problem. These old domestic brands were rooted too deeply in the hearts of consumers. Raise the price, no one buys. Change the formula, everyone complains. Swap the packaging, people say it does not look like itself anymore. The brand sediment is too thick. It cannot be moved. It can only be placed on the low-end line — giving old consumers a place to go, while using your position to block other domestic brands from moving up.

Squeezed into the cracks.

Brand	Category	Price Band	Predicament
Bee & Flower	Shampoo	10-15 yuan	The value-for-money moat is also the ceiling
Shanghai Sulfur Soap	Soap	2 yuan	Category too narrow, cannot expand
Blue Moon	Laundry Liquid	Mid-range	Sandwiched between Liby and foreign brands
Yu Mei Jing	Children’s Face Cream	10-20 yuan	Losing younger consumers

These brands have stable consumers. But they can never achieve brand premium. Bee & Flower sells for fifteen yuan. It is not that it does not want to sell for forty. It is that the shelf position for forty yuan has already been locked down by foreign brands.

The greatest predicament of a crack brand: alive, but cannot grow. Once it grows, it will be noticed by foreign capital. Either beaten down, or acquired.

II. The Capital Perspective: How Much of the Scraps Are Left

I understand finance. From a capital perspective, the competition in the daily chemical industry is not a competition of brand management. It is a competition of profit pool distribution.

2.1 The Profit Pool Structure

┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│       Daily Chemical Industry Profit Pool    │
│                                             │
│  ┌──────────────────────────┐               │
│  │  Brand Premium 40%-50%   │ ← Foreign    │
│  │  P&G / Unilever / L'Oreal│   Capital    │
│  └──────────────────────────┘               │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                      │
│  │ Channel Cost 25%-35% │ ← Supermarkets │
│  │                      │   / Tmall /     │
│  │                      │   Douyin        │
│  └──────────────────┘                      │
│  ┌──────────────┐                          │
│  │ Mfg Cost 15%-20% │ ← OEM / Raw        │
│  │                  │   Materials /      │
│  │                  │   Logistics        │
│  └──────────────┘                          │
│  ┌──────┐                                  │
│  │5%-10%│ ← Shared by hundreds of          │
│  └──────┘   domestic brands                │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘

2.2 The Same Bottle of Shampoo: Who Takes the Money

Link	Foreign Brand (Head & Shoulders)	Domestic Brand (Bee & Flower)
Retail Price	40 yuan	15 yuan
Manufacturing Cost	5 yuan	5 yuan
Brand Premium	35 yuan	10 yuan
Channel Cost Rate	~25%	~35%
Brand Owner Profit	High	Razor-thin

The same liquid. Possibly from the same OEM factory. After leaving the factory, one gets a P&G label and sells for forty yuan. The other gets a Bee & Flower label and sells for fifteen. The twenty-plus yuan difference is not in the bottle. It is in the brand.

2.3 Unit Profit Model for a Domestic Daily Chemical Brand

Cost Item	Amount (Based on 30 yuan retail)	Percentage
Retail Price	30 yuan	100%
Manufacturing Cost	5 yuan	17%
Packaging Cost	3 yuan	10%
Logistics & Warehousing	2 yuan	7%
Channel Cost (Platform + Traffic + KOL)	10-12 yuan	33%-40%
Marketing (Seeding + Promotion + Endorsement)	5 yuan	17%
Admin Amortization	2 yuan	7%
Pre-Tax Profit	1-3 yuan	3%-10%

Priced at thirty yuan. Profit in hand, one to three yuan. Drop the price below twenty yuan, profit is zero or negative. This does not even account for returns, dead stock losses, or the damage from forced price wars.

2.4 The Death Spiral

Weak Brand → High Channel Cost → Thin Profit → No Money for Branding → Weaker Brand
    ↑                                                                    ↓
    └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

This is not a problem of brand management. It is a problem of capital structure. An industry with its profit space compressed to a mere 5%-10% cannot nurture a century-old brand. The century-old brands of Europe and America built their moats in an era when channel costs were low, capital did not force maturity, and consumers were not impatient. The table Chinese brands face today is not the same table.

III. The Illusion of Overnight Fame

3.1 Who Is Dreaming of Overnight Fame

After all these years in brand design, I have noticed a strange phenomenon. Many brand founders in China are dreaming the same dream — overnight fame.

It is not that they are restless. The entire ecosystem is forcing them to dream this dream.

Pressure	Source	How It Forces Them
Capital	VC/PE	IPO in three years, exit in five, 10x return
Platforms	Tmall / Douyin / Pinduoduo	Algorithms reward speed, punish slowness
Consumers	Livestream users	Trained to wait for new products, grab flash sales
Competitors	Peers	If you are not fast, someone faster takes your place

Capital does not wait. A brand builds slowly — through product strength, word of mouth, repeat purchases. It may take ten or twenty years to see a return. Capital cannot wait. A brand in the eyes of capital is not a brand. It is a target. A target needs growth rate. It needs scale. It needs a growth story that can be told in a roadshow pitch deck.

Platforms do not give you the chance to be slow. Tmall’s algorithm. Douyin’s traffic distribution. Pinduoduo’s price comparison mechanism. All platforms are doing the same thing: rewarding whoever runs fast, punishing whoever walks slow. One livestream, several thousand orders go out. Next month, without traffic investment, sales reset to zero. It is not that brands do not want to be slow. It is that platforms will not let you be slow.

Consumers are also being trained to only recognize the new. Livestream countdowns. Limited flash sales. Hot new arrivals. She is not choosing a brand. She is choosing whoever is running a promotion today. A brand finally accumulates a bit of recognition. A new brand appears — better packaging, cheaper price, more lively livestream. She leaves.

3.2 The Price of Overnight Fame

Brand	How It Became Famous	What Happened After
Perfect Diary	Xiaohongshu seeding + top KOL	Traffic costs rose, repurchase rate could not support valuation, stock price collapsed
Genki Forest	Zero sugar, zero fat, zero calories broke through the category	Coca-Cola + Pepsi channel siege, distributors forced to choose sides
Florasis	Chinese heritage design + top KOL	Growth slowed after KOL livestream halt

Overnight fame can put you on the stage. The stage lights are rigged by capital and platforms. When the lights go out, are you still there?

3.3 The Brands That Did Not Dream, and Lived Longer Instead

Brand	Founded	How It Survived	Core Competence
Bee & Flower	1985	No seeding, no traffic investment, packaging unchanged for decades	Thirty years of consumption inertia
Shanghai Sulfur Soap	1980s	Two yuan a bar, always there on the bottom shelf	Rigid demand from specific人群
Yu Mei Jing	1980s	Passed down generation by generation, Fresh Milk Cream	Intergenerational transmission

Bee & Flower never dreamed the dream of overnight fame. No social media seeding. No top KOL livestreams. No traffic investment on Douyin. Its packaging has not changed for decades. So ugly that young people complained about it online. The complaints went viral, and unexpectedly drove a wave of sales.

But Bee & Flower does not need viral moments. Its consumers were not drawn in by online种草. They came because “my family has used this since I was little.” This kind of trust cannot be rushed out by a wave of traffic. It is accumulated bottle by bottle, over thirty years. A viral moment comes, sales spike. The viral moment passes, sales return to baseline — but the baseline is enough to live on. Because it did not spend several years of future profits in advance to buy that one night of fame.

Overnight fame is not a sin. But treating it as the only path is a trap. A brand can have a moment of overnight fame — that moment should be the ignition point after sufficient accumulation, not the entirety of the brand. Treating overnight fame as the ultimate goal is like building a house on fireworks. The explosion is beautiful. The next morning, all that is left is ash.

IV. The Truth About Century-Old Brands

4.1 They Did Not Become Famous Overnight

This cannot be blamed on Chinese entrepreneurs. It is not that they do not want to build century-old brands. It is that they have never seen how a century-old brand grows.

Brand	Founded	Years Ago	What It Was Doing in Its First Thirty Years
Hermes	1837	188	Made horse harnesses for a full sixty years. The age of the carriage passed. Almost died.
Louis Vuitton	1854	171	A trunk-packer for the Empress of France. Took over a decade to open his first store.
Chanel	1910	115	A girl who grew up in an orphanage. Her first store was a hat shop, not a fashion house.
Shiseido	1872	153	Its first location was a Western-style pharmacy. Sold medicine for forty years before pivoting to cosmetics.
Kao	1887	138	Initially sold imported soap. For its first fifty years, it was merely a wholesale grocery distributor.

In their first decades, these brands had no capital forcing maturity. No traffic support. No option for overnight fame. They grew up in an era where “slow” was the norm. In that era, consumers did not expect new products to drop every month. Capital did not demand 30% annual growth. Platforms did not run price comparison rankings.

A brand could spend ten years perfecting a single product. Spend twenty years accumulating a base of loyal customers. Spend fifty years becoming the industry standard.

4.2 They Survived the Hardest Times

Brand	Crises Endured
Hermes	The carriage replaced by the automobile, two World Wars, multiple economic crises
Shiseido	The Great Kanto Earthquake, factory bombed in WWII, post-war reconstruction
Chanel	Death of the founder, brand低谷, acquired and later repurchased

These century-old brands are not without experience of crisis. They faced crises far more desperate than what Chinese brands face today — war bombing their factories to rubble, economic crises emptying consumer wallets, technological revolutions淘汰 entire product categories. But they did not die. Because “holding on” was not something they only thought of when crisis came. They were holding on from the very first day they were founded.

4.3 Chinese Brands Have Only One Frame of Reference

Dimension	Western & Japanese Century Brands	Chinese Brands
Era of growth	Slow was the norm	Fast is the norm
Founder’s frame of reference	Peers spent decades	GDP growing at 8%+ per year
Capital’s attitude	Patient, unhurried	Exit required in three to five years
Consumer expectations	Stable, reliable	New products every month
Brand education	Century-long history is common knowledge	Almost a vacuum

Chinese entrepreneurs were born into an era where “fast” is the norm. Over forty years of reform and opening up, from poverty to the world’s second-largest economy. This speed has shaped a mindset: everything can be faster. Products can be launched faster. Distribution can be铺开 faster. Brands can become famous faster. Fast is right, because the entire era is fast.

But they overlooked one thing. A brand is not GDP. A brand is culture. Culture cannot be rushed into maturity. A person can become rich overnight. An aristocrat requires three generations. A brand, like an aristocrat, requires time.

Brand history education is almost a vacuum in China. No one tells them what Hermes was doing in its first sixty years. No one tells them how Shiseido survived its first fifty years. We only promote the results of success. We do not promote the process of success. They mistakenly believe that these brands became famous overnight — it is just that their “overnight” happened a hundred years ago.

V. Time Is the Highest Barrier

5.1 We Have Written About Luxury

They are all over a hundred years old. If Chinese brands were also a hundred years old, would international brands and international capital dare to eat them recklessly? No. They would choke.

When a brand has lived for a hundred years, it means generations have grown up smelling its scent, applying its cream, washing with its soap. The brand is no longer a brand. It is collective memory. Capital can buy the trademark. Buy the distribution. Buy the factory. But it cannot buy the place in her heart that says “this is what my mother used, what my grandmother used.” If it cannot buy that, it can only let it remain on the shelf. Trying to swallow it by force will cause choking.

5.2 Look at Bee & Flower from Another Angle

Dimension	Bee & Flower (Now)	Bee & Flower (Another 70 Years)
Age	~40 years	110 years
Brand Status	Low-end domestic	The Kao of China
Pricing Power	None, locked at 15 yuan	Yes,消费 inertia of generations
Foreign Capital’s Attitude	Not an opponent	Untouchable
Brand Value	Maintained by volume	Irreplaceable brand equity

Right now, you look at Bee & Flower, Shanghai Sulfur Soap, Yu Mei Jing, and feel they are living in humiliation. At the very bottom shelf. Selling for a dozen yuan. Profit thin as paper. But look at it from another angle — they have already lived for over thirty years. Live another seventy, and they become the Kao of China, the Shiseido of China.

On that day, would P&G still dare treat them as scraps? Would Unilever still dare stuff their trademarks into a low-end portfolio matrix? Capital wants to eat? It will choke.

5.3 The Finance Formula

Brand Value = Discounted Future Cash Flow

Short-term brand: Uncertain cash flow → High discount rate → Low valuation
Century-old brand: Predictable cash flow → Low discount rate → High valuation

This is not comfort. It is financial logic. A brand that has lived a hundred years has a cash flow that is predictable, stable, and does not require traffic investment to maintain. What this certainty is worth in the financial market is not calculated by annual sales. It is calculated by the fact that “it cannot possibly disappear.” And “cannot possibly disappear” — only time can bestow that.

VI. Written at the End

After all these years in brand design, the sentence I dread hearing most is not “this design doesn’t look good.” It is “packaging is just something you throw away after opening.”

No.

The endpoint of packaging is not to be discarded. The endpoint of a brand is not to be eaten, shelved, or squeezed into the cracks.

The reason Chinese brands have not emerged is not because we cannot do good design, cannot make good products, or cannot do good marketing. It is because we have only had thirty or forty years, while the opponents have had one hundred and thirty.

But thirty or forty years have already walked the road that others took a hundred years to walk. Give it a few more decades. Who knows.

If one day, Shanghai Sulfur Soap becomes the Kao of China, Bee & Flower becomes the Shiseido of China, and those brands once squeezed into the cracks become presences that no one dares to touch —

That day will not be the result of overnight fame. It will be the compound interest of time, finally beginning to pay out.

What Chinese brands are missing is not good products. But perhaps it is time.

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